A February 2017 CNSC symposium (zuotanhui, 座谈会) was attended by twelve Politburo members (Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Wang Huning, Liu Qizhen, Sun Zhengcai, Fan Changlong, Meng Jianzhu, Hu Chunhua, Li Zhanshu, Guo Jinlong, and Han Zheng), and eight other top central government and military leaders (Yang Jing, Guo Shengwei, Fang Fenghui, Zhang Yang, Yang Jiechi, Zhou Xiaochuan, Zhao Keshi, and Zhang Youxia); reports indicated that all provincial party secretaries also attended this symposium. One of the few top female officials in China, Wu had focused on the role of the judicial system in maintaining social stability. 12, No. [xliii], Other changes occurred in the MSS (guojia anquanbu, 国家安全部). Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, there have been major structural, personnel, and policy changes to the CCP’s approach to domestic security. Medical metaphors are common: patients who have been infected by extremist thinking must be saved before the symptoms appear. [lxviii] Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, eds., Ethnic Conflict in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China’s West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), pp. Her research focuses on security, East Asia, and authoritarian politics. Policing dissidents,” Albawaba, 31 May 2018, at https://www.albawaba.com/news/china%E2%80%99s-newest-global-export-policing-dissidents-1139230, [lxvi] “Xi Jinping zai Zhong-A hezuo luntan dibajie buzhang ji huiyi kaimushishang de jianghua” [Xi Jinping’s speech at the opening ceremony of the 8th ministerial meeting of the China-Arab cooperation forum], Xinhua, 10 July 2018, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-07/10/c_1123105156.htm. Apart from observing residents and gathering information, grid managers and their public security counterparts sometimes engage in soft forms of repression, such as persuasion and intimidation, to preemptively demobilize potential political dissent. Although officials from the Supreme Court had announced that his trial would be public, charges in April 2015 were followed by a May trial in a closed Tianjin courtroom. [lxxx], The use of advanced technologies to police the XUAR has also drawn scrutiny, and is one of the reasons behind the Western tightening of exports of technical components to security-technology companies such as Hikvision and Dahua. Thus far, public coverage of the CNSC has been limited. 2019. [l] Some of these officials were accused of providing protective umbrellas for illicit activities and corruption in their respective areas of jurisdiction, a term that was referenced again in Xi’s January 2019 speech to the Central Political and Legal Work Conference. Xi has complemented this organizational restructuring with a set of new laws intended to enhance control over Chinese society, including laws on cybersecurity, management of non-governmental organizations, intelligence, and others. [lxii] Officials and technology companies generally highlight the cutting-edge use of data and technology (biometrics, artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and the like) as an example of China’s global leadership in this sector, and they emphasize the benefits of this approach for public safety—for example, quoting a daughter in Changsha who credited the Tianwang system with quickly finding her lost mother. In June 2014, he was expelled from the CCP and transferred to the judicial authorities on charges of bribery; in January 2016, he was sentenced to sixteen years in prison for bribery totaling ~22 million RMB (~3.5 million USD). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-china/china-envoy-says-no-accurate-figure-on-uighurs-fighting-in-syria-idUSKCN1L508G; https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ClarkeKan-Uighur-Foreign-Fighters-An-Underexamined-Jihadist-Challenge-Nov-2017-1.pdf, https://apnews.com/360a77319815495a842befe1fcd7f5c9, https://www.economist.com/china/2018/03/28/china-is-trying-to-prevent-the-formation-of-a-vocal-uighur-diaspora, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/05/31/does-chinas-digital-police-state-have-echoes-in-the-west, http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170228/50738224_0.shtml. [lvii] Indeed, one of the explicitly stated purposes of grid management is to give local officials better information early on, thereby providing them with the capacity to respond preventively to potential sources of social unrest. [xxvii], Personnel Changes within the Domestic Security Apparatus. During Xi’s tenure, the CCP has expanded its application of technology-based tools of surveillance and social management, a process that Sebastian Heilmann calls “Digital Leninism.”[lii] These efforts seek to combine technology, big data, and artificial intelligence to improve Chinese governance and to ensure that the state can monitor and track, in close to real-time, the behavior of its citizens. Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. Meanwhile, new laws on domestic security and expanding tech-based approaches to social control, such as grid management, represent an attempt to strengthen the CCP’s ability to police contention within Chinese society as the CCP’s shifting security strategy in Xinjiang has also resulted in heightened international scrutiny and attention. [ix] “Members of the National Security Commission debut at the News Network,” Pengpai xinwen, 17 February 2017, at, “Former senior justice official jailed for bribery,” Xinhua, 31 October 2018, at, [xlviii] China sacks ally of former security chief as graft probe widens,” Reuters, 27 March 2014, at, [lxiv] Koh Hong-Eng, “How video cameras can make cities safer and contribute to economic growth,” South China Morning Post, 3 June 2018, at, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-02/06/c_127467007.htm, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-01/20/c_1114065786.htm, http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-13840.html, https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2019/01/id/3707480.shtml, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/16/content_17436806.htm, https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-national-security-commission-holds-first-meeting/, http://news.sohu.com/20170217/n481030722.shtml, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/17/c_137118101.htm, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-10/30/c_136713601.htm, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2018-03-21/doc-ifysnhat1097446.shtml, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/27/c_137003886.htm, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-so-controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/28/WS5a441fa5a31008cf16da3d96.html, http://www.bjnews.com.cn/inside/2018/04/06/482152.html, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1094618.shtml, https://jamestown.org/program/corralling-the-peoples-armed-police-centralizing-control-to-reflect-centralized-budgets/, https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-rise-of-the-31st-army-in-chinese-politics/, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2125880/china-brings-peoples-armed-police-under-control-top, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-lawmaking-spy-idUSKBN0IL2N520141101, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/anti-espionage/, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2015nsl/, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/%e5%8f%8d%e6%81%90%e6%80%96%e4%b8%bb%e4%b9%89%e6%b3%95-%ef%bc%882015%ef%bc%89/, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2016-11/07/content_2001605.htm, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/cybersecuritylaw/, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2016-foreign-ngo-law/. In addition to platforms that integrate the various layers of grid data, the nationwide Skynet program (tianwang gongcheng, 天网工程), led by the zhengfawei and overseen by the ministries of public security and industry and information technology, has deployed millions of CCTV cameras augmented with facial recognition technology; recent reports have also mentioned the introduction of facial recognition glasses by police officers in Beijing, Tianjin, and Xinjiang. Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. Apart from observing residents and gathering information, grid managers and their public security counterparts sometimes engage in soft forms of repression, such as persuasion and intimidation, to preemptively demobilize potential political dissent. To date, Huawei has assisted “Safe City” projects in over 100 cities, promoting itself as a cutting-edge public safety platform with demonstrated success in crime reduction across numerous countries. In addition to platforms that integrate the various layers of grid data, the nationwide Skynet program (tianwang gongcheng, 天网工程), led by the zhengfawei and overseen by the ministries of public security and industry and information technology, has deployed millions of CCTV cameras augmented with facial recognition technology; recent reports have also mentioned the introduction of facial recognition glasses by police officers in Beijing, Tianjin, and Xinjiang. In March 2017, a party document on new “de-extremification regulations” (新疆维吾尔自治区去极端化条例) called for transformation through education. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/sheena-chestnut-greitens [v] One of the primary drivers for creating the CNSC was to improve intelligence-sharing and policy coordination by reducing bureaucratic stove-piping and fragmentation across previously atomized military, intelligence, and public security organizations. Former minister Guo Shengkun (who served from 2012 to 2017) now heads the zhengfawei; all of the vice ministers who served under Guo Shengkun in 2012 are gone, either retired (4), arrested (Li Dongsheng and Meng Hongwei), demoted (Yang Huanning, 杨焕宁), or transferred (Huang Ming, 黄明). This framing, however, also points to China’s long-standing concern with linkages between domestic unrest and hostile forces outside of China, in particular in this context fears of Uighur separatism forming operational links with al-Qaeda and now ISIS. [xvii] Moreover, under a reform plan codified in March 2018, the composition of the PAP itself has changed. Organizationally, the biggest changes include the establishment of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) (zhongyang guojia anquan weiyuanhui, 中央国家安全委员会), announced in November 2013; the creation of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) (guojia jiancha weiyuanhui, 国家监察委员会), created in 2018; and the restructuring of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) (zhongguo renmin wuzhuang jingcha budui, 中国人民武装警察部队) in 2017-18. By Sheena Chestnut Greitens May 16, 2017 at 12:00 p.m. UTC President Trump raised eyebrows in late April with a phone call to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte — … See Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Susan Shirk, Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Statement Before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. The most prominent of the municipal-level officials to fall is Liang Ke (see above). [ii]  “Zhe liang nian Xi Jinping dai huo de 12 ge re ci” [Xi Jinping’s hot phrases during the past two years], Xinhua, 6 February 2015, at http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2015-02/06/c_127467007.htm, [iii]  “Xi Jinping jiu zhengfa gongzuo zuochu zhongyao zhishi” [Xi Jinping issues important instructions on political-legal work], Xinhua, 20 January 2015, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-01/20/c_1114065786.htm; see also Meng Jianzhu’s elaboration: “Qieshi tigao zhengfa jiguan fuwu daju de nengli he shuiping” [Effectively improve the ability and level of political and legal organs to serve the overall situation], Renmin fayuan bao, 18 March 2015,  at http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-13840.html, [iv] Xinhua reported, “习近平在讲话中强调，党的十八大以来，党中央把政法工作摆到更加重要的位置来抓，作出一系列重大决策，实施一系列重大举措，维护了政治安全、社会安定、人民安宁，促进了经济社会持续健康发展.”  See “Xi Jinping zai zhongyang zhengfa gongzuo  huiyi shang qiangdiao [Xi Jinping’s emphasis at the Central Political & Legal Work Conference],” Xinhua, 16 January 2019, at https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2019/01/id/3707480.shtml, [v] Zhang Yunbi, “Xi outlines new strategy to protect nation,” China Daily, 16 April 2014, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-04/16/content_17436806.htm; Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s National Security Commission Holds First Meeting,” The Diplomat, 16 April 2014, at https://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-national-security-commission-holds-first-meeting/. With that in mind, this article reviews four of the major developments in domestic/public security work that have occurred in China under Xi Jinping: changes to the organizational structures and legal frameworks that shape domestic security policy and practice in China; changes in internal security personnel due to both regular retirement and the ongoing anti-corruption campaign; expansion of “grid management” and other high-tech surveillance and social-management tools; and the CCP’s changing domestic security strategy in Xinjiang. [lvi] For example, Hu Chongming, “Zaizuzhihua yu Zhongguo shehui guanli chuangxin” [Reorganization and China’s social management innovation], Gonggong guanli xuebao [Journal of Public Management],  No.1 (2013): 63–70; Tian Xiong and Cao Jingqing, “Xianyu keceng zuzhi guize yu nongcun wangge hua guanli beilun” [The paradox of county bureaucracy and rural grid management], Xiandai chengshi yanjiu [Modern Urban Research], No. For instance, one recent profile of a Nanjing grid manager praises her for preventing a resident from organizing a group of petitioners who planned to travel to Beijing. [xx], The final change in the structure of domestic security under Xi Jinping has been the passage of a series of laws intended to tighten control over Chinese society. “Domestic security in China under Xi Jinping.” China Leadership Monitor 59, 1 March, https://www.prcleader.org/greitens. Medical metaphors are common: patients who have been infected by extremist thinking must be saved before the symptoms appear. [xiii] Local supervision commissions report horizontally to the local people’s congresses and vertically to the supervision commission at the next higher level, while they are also subject to party oversight. [lxxiv] Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Xinjiang’s rapidly evolving security state,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. [vi] You Ji, “China’s National Security Commission: Theory, evolution, and operations,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 25, No. in terms of China’s successful model of pandemic management and global health leadership,” Sheena Greitens, who … The IJOP collects data from video cameras, security checkpoints, and other official records, uses predictive algorithms to analyze it, and then provides the information to local officials so they can respond rapidly. [xviii] These reforms also limit the ability of local or provincial authorities to deploy the PAP, and are intended both to strengthen central party control over the armed police force and to align command structures with the existing distribution of PAP spending. [xxix] In late July 2014, Xinhua announced that Zhou had been under investigation for corruption since late 2013; Zhou was expelled from the CCP and formally arrested in December 2014. Press: comms@cnas.org. 52 (March 2018): 58–73; Jamie P. Horsley, “What’s so controversial about China’s new anti-corruption body,” The Diplomat, 30 May 2018, at https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-so-controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body, [xvii] Zhao Lei, “Command of Armed Police to be unified,” China Daily, 28 December 2017, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/28/WS5a441fa5a31008cf16da3d96.html, [xviii] Ni Wei, “Wujing gaige de chu yu jin: ba da jing zhong shoushen jianti [Armed Police Reform Emergence & Advancement: Downsizing the Eight Corps], Beijing News, 6 April 2018, at http://www.bjnews.com.cn/inside/2018/04/06/482152.html, [xix] Deng Xiaoci, “Civilian-oriented troops withdrawn from armed police force, enhancing CPC management,” Global Times, 21 March 2018, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1094618.shtml; Adrian Zenz, Corralling the People’s Armed Police: Centralizing Control to Reflect Centralized Budgets,” Jamestown China Brief, Vol. There was some belief that in the past this fragmentation had prevented Chinese leaders from receiving the information needed to make decisions in a timely, proactive manner. In his accompanying remarks, Xi Jinping called for enhanced party-building efforts within the national security system. Available at < https://www.prcleader.org/greitens >. A number of articles also highlight problems that require ongoing attention and consideration, such as unresolved bureaucratic fragmentation; the need for better cross-jurisdictional integration of different grid management platforms; improved accountability to solve potential social problems once they are identified; care with adapting grid management to more rural areas; and the relatively high financial and personnel costs of the system. These include (but are not limited to) laws on counter-espionage (反间谍法, 2014);[xxi] national security (国家安全法, 2015);[xxii] counter-terrorism (反恐怖主义法, 2015);[xxiii] cyber-security (网络安全法, 2016);[xxiv] management of foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs, 境外非政府组织境内活动管理法, 2016),[xxv] and national intelligence (国家情报法, 2017). xÝóö6/ì p{3Ì ]‡¯üõÕ!›Ñ¥£½ñ¼‰X‹ž8P³ä8,¸ÑÛ$Pˆ…ŸØ؀«‰ÜÆ „ÐîëR›ßélø¢ƒ¹Ï{åƒìÄɔÁg=N…JμڔÀ!椹ÂÖ&ܖ&æcıvµÐóðj#Ç̋r! The CCDI announced in December 2013 that Li Dongsheng was under investigation; days later, he was removed from his MPS post. Prior to Zhou’s ascension to the PSC, he had been a Politburo member and Minister of Public Security (2002–7); under his leadership, the number of provincial police chiefs and political-legal committee chairs involved in provincial party leadership across the country increased sharply. Her first book, Dictators & Their Secret Police (Cambridge, 2016) received the 2017 Best Book Award from both the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. In 2012, Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was removed after an investigation into an aide’s alleged spying for the United States. https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-analysis-available-data/; https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/, http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2017/0330/c186332-29942874.html, https://www-tandfonline-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/doi/full/10.1080/02634937.2018.1507997, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-07/06/content_16741513.htm. [lvii] “Wo shenbian de wangge yuan” [The grid member around me], Politics and Law Committee of the Nanjing Municipal CCP, 4 June 2018, at http://www.njzf.gov.cn/cxwghshzl/201806/t20180604_5416204.html. [xxx], The anti-corruption campaign targeted three parts of Zhou’s network: those from Sichuan province, the energy sector, and the public security apparatus. [xix] Since coming to office, Xi has also replaced the leadership of the PAP; in 2014, PLA officer Wang Ning (王宁), who had not previously served in the PAP but who is seen as an associate of Xi’s, became the PAP’s commanding officer. Meng’s Interpol position had been seen as a mark of China’s growing leadership in international institutions, but it had also raised concern that Interpol would be used to crack down on dissidents and Xi’s political opponents abroad. 4 (March 2017), at https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiangs-rapidly-evolving-security-state/, [lxxv] XUAR government, “Xinjiang Weiwu’er Zizhiqu qu jiduan hua tiaoli,” [XUAR de-extremification regulations], Tianshan wang, 30 March 2017, at http://xj.people.com.cn/n2/2017/0330/c186332-29942874.html, https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs/, [lxxvii] James Millward, “Reeducating Xinjiang’s Muslims,” New York Review of Books, 7 February 2019, at https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/02/07/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims/, [lxxviii] “Investigations reveal details of Xinjiang terror attack,” Xinhua, 6 July 2013, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-07/06/content_16741513.htm, [lxxix] “About 300 Chinese said fighting alongside Islamic state in Middle East,” Reuters, 15 December 2014, at 20141215?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews;" target="_blank">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-china-idUSKBN0JT0UX20141215?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews; “China envoy says no accurate figure on Uighurs fighting in Syria,” Reuters, 20 August 2018, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-china/china-envoy-says-no-accurate-figure-on-uighurs-fighting-in-syria-idUSKCN1L508G; Colin P. Clarke and Paul Rexton Kan, “Uighur foreign fighters: An underexamined Jihadist challenge,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, at https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ClarkeKan-Uighur-Foreign-Fighters-An-Underexamined-Jihadist-Challenge-Nov-2017-1.pdf ; Gerry Shih, “China’s Uighurs grapple with pull of extremism,” Associated Press, 29 December 2017, at https://apnews.com/360a77319815495a842befe1fcd7f5c9, [lxxx] “China is trying to prevent the formation of a vocal Uighur diaspora,” The Economist, 28 March 2018, at https://www.economist.com/china/2018/03/28/china-is-trying-to-prevent-the-formation-of-a-vocal-uighur-diaspora, [lxxxi] See the following document, issued by the Manas county government: “关于印发玛纳斯镇人口精准登记核实和依法规范身份证管理工作实施方案,” [The implementation plan for the accurate registration and verification of the population in Manas Town and regulation of identity card management according to the law], People’s Government of Manas County, 6 April 2018, at http://www.mns.gov.cn/gk/wj/840567.htm ; see also “Xinjiang jiang qidong shishi quan jiang renkou dengji jingzhun heshi gongzuo, yi nan jiang diqu wei zhongdian” [Xinjiang will launch  implementation of accurate verification of population registration in Xinjiang, focusing on southern Xinjiang], Pengpai xinwen, 22 February 2017, at, https://news.qq.com/a/20170222/024832.htm, [lxxxii] “Does China’s digital police state have echoes in the West?” The Economist, 31 May 2018, at https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/05/31/does-chinas-digital-police-state-have-echoes-in-the-west, [lxxxiii] “ 新疆巴州：6月30日前所有车须装北斗定位装置 ” [Bazhou, Xinjiang: All cars must be equipped with a Beidou positioning device before June 30], 28 February 2017, at http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170228/50738224_0.shtml; “‘Web cleansing’: China’s Xinjiang residents forced to install surveillance apps on their mobile phones,” Hong Kong Free Press, 22 July 2017, at, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/07/22/web-cleansing-chinas-xinjiang-residents-forced-install-surveillance-apps-mobile-phones/, Domestic Security in China under Xi Jinping.

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